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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of Case. 
This case involves a boundary line dispute in Bonner County, Idaho. On April 19, 2010, 
The Plaintiffs/Respondents Jean Coleman, Terri Boyd-Davis, and Brian Davis (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Coleman") pled ownership of a portion of the Appellant/Defendants 
Tim and Carol Baker's property (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Baker") up to a fence 
line based upon claims of adverse possession, boundary by acquiescence, and reformation of 
Coleman's warranty deeds. 
The following are depictions of the parcels and the "Disputed Property:" 
/I 
(Ex. C, enhanced). 















A four day bench trial was held from March 28, 2011 through March 31, 2011. The Court 
concluded that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove both their adverse possession and boundary by 
acquiescence claims, but nevertheless quieted title to a portion of the disputed property to 
Coleman. In so doing, the Court took the unusual step of issuing two decisions. The Court first 
issued a primary decision in which the Court concluded that the grantor intended to convey to 
Coleman the disputed property up to the fence line despite the lack of any call within the deed to 
the fence line. . The alternative decision issued by the Court is based on overlapping legal 
descriptions in recorded deeds, and grants to Coleman a lesser amount of Baker's land. 
The District Court's primary decision is clearly erroneous because the foundation of the 
decision is the Court's finding of fact that the grantors intended to convey property up to a fence 
line that did not exist when the grantor drafted and delivered the relevant deeds. Indeed, the 
Court's findings of fact directly conflict, and undermine the basis for the Court's decision. 
Specifically, the Court found that Harry Clark, through the Warranty Deed that was executed on 
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December 23, 1970, intended to gift to Coleman property up to the fence line. (Tr., Court Trial, 
p.1043 ). But, the Court also found that the fence line did not exist at the time that Harry Clark 
drafted the Coleman Deed, because it wasn't constructed until 1971, (Tr., Court Trial, pp.1029, 
1040-1041) after the property to the South (now Baker's property) was sold to Cliff and Joan 
Johnson. The Court found that the grantee, Cliff Johnson, built the fence, not Harry Clark, and 
there was no evidence admitted at trial to support any finding that Harry Clark knew where the 
fence was going to be located, or participated in any manner with its construction. (Id.). 
Therefore, it would have been impossible for the Clarks to have intended to convey up to a fence 
line which did not exist at the time that the Clarks gifted the property to Coleman. Yet, that was 
the basis for the Court's decision. 
Furthermore, the District Court's decision abandons virtually all of the distance and the 
bearing calls in the 1970 Coleman Warranty Deed, and results in a bizarrely shaped parcel of 
property, which cannot be reconciled with the deed itself. In fact, it cannot be reconciled with 
any deed of record in the case because all of the deeds describe the northerly and southerly 
boundaries of all of the parcels at issue as running due east and west. None describe a 
meandering boundary on the North and South. Although it is undisputed that the 1970 Coleman 
Deed is ambiguous as to the location of the point of true beginning, such a finding does not allow 
the Court to draw new legal boundaries out of whole cloth, based upon a fence line which did not 
exist at the time the property was conveyed. The Court cannot ignore all of the calls in the deed 
simply to set out a more convenient description that cannot be reasonably reconciled with the 
actual language in the deed itself. In a nutshell, the law does not permit the District Court to 
wholly "re-imagine" the boundaries of a parcel of land under the guise of interpreting the deed. 
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It appears the District Court itself recognized that its decision was flawed, as it issued an 
"Alternative Decision," in which it quieted title in favor of Coleman to only a small portion of 
the Disputed Property, based upon a finding that the legal descriptions in the competing deeds 
overlap. The Court's interpretation in this alternative decision maintains most of the calls in the 
deed and grants the overlap between the boundaries to Plaintiff Coleman on grounds that the 
Coleman deed was recorded first. Unlike the flawed primary decision, this finding is not based 
upon the location of a fence which did not exist at the time of the conveyance, and is supported 
by the competent and substantial evidence admitted at trial. This Court should adopt the District 
Court's Alternative Decision. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings. 
This case has an extensive post-trial procedural history. Coleman filed her Complaint on 
April 19, 2010. (R., Vol. V, Bates 038-050). A four day bench trial was held from March 28, 
2011 through March 31, 2011. During trial, the Court bifurcated the issue of ownership of the 
Disputed Property from that of damages. Consequently, the trial dealt only with the ownership of 
the Disputed Property. The damages phase of this case has yet to be tried. 
The Court announced its trial decision in open court on April 28, 2011, (Tr., Court Trial, 
p. 1020-1048) and issued an Order Determining Liability that same day R., Vol. V, Bates 0838-
0840), which was amended on May 6, 2011 (R., Vol. V, 0841-0843). Through this decision, the 
Court quieted title to the Respondent Coleman in the entirety of the Disputed Property. 
Baker filed a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration on May 12, 2011 (R., Vol. V, 
Bates 0844-0846), which was heard by the trial Court on July 6, 2011. (Tr. Motion for 
Reconsideration and Clarification, p. 1-36) The Court issued its Decision re: Bakers' Motion for 
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Clarification and Reconsideration on September 2, 2011 (R., Vol. V, Bates 0875-0887), in which 
the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration, but ordered that Coleman conduct a 
survey of the Disputed Property, and submit a legal description of the Disputed Property with a 
proposed judgment. 
On November 3, 2011, Coleman submitted a fax to the District Court which included her 
proposed Judgment. (R., Vol. V. Bates 900-0911). Baker submitted their objection to the 
proposed Judgment on November 15, 2011 (Id.), and supplemented the Objection on January 20, 
2012. (R., Vol. VI, Bates 0958-0974). A hearing was held on April 18, 2012, at which time the 
Court took the matter under advisement. 
The District Court issued a Memorandum Decision re: Defendants' Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment on July 13, 2012 (R. Vol. VI, Bates 1075-1084), in which it 
reversed its decision, in part, by quieting title to Coleman in only a portion of the Disputed 
Parcel. According to this decision, the title to the Disputed Property is quieted to the parties as 
illustrated in the follow diagram: 
Portion of Disputed 
Property Quieted to 
Baker 
Also on July 13, 2012, the District Court filed its Memorandum Decision re: Remaining 
Liability Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint (R., Vol. VI, Bates 1085-
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1100), in which it issued an "Alternative Decision," should its decision be overturned on appeal. 
In the Court 's Alternative Decision, the Court found that the 1970 Coleman Deed (Ex. 3) and the 
1971 Johnson Deed (Ex.7) overlap as to a small portion of the Disputed Property. (R., Vol. VI, 
Bates 1085-1100). Because the Coleman Deed was recorded first, Coleman is the owner of the 
portion of the Disputed Property over which the deeds overlap (hereinafter referred to as "the 
Overlap"). (Id.) The Court also found that Coleman acquired the Overlap by adverse possession 
through written instrument. (R., Vol. VI, Bates 1085-1100). According to the District Court, if 
this Court reverses the District Court's finding as to the then non-existent fence line being the 
intent of the grantor, then only ownership of the Overlap is quieted to Coleman, with the 
remainder quieted to Baker. (Id.) 
The property quieted to Coleman under the Alternative Decision is depicted as follows: 
Plamtiffs' 
Trial Exhibit 23 
(Id.) 
On August 7, 2012, Respondent Terri Boyd-Davis submitted a letter to the Court asking 
for reconsideration of the Court's findings. (R., Vol. VI, Bates 1115-1121 ). After further briefing 
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by both parties, this matter was noticed for hearing which was held on October 17, 2012, at 
which time the Court took the matter under advisement. 
On September 13, 2012, the District Court issued a Partial Judgment Quieting Title in 
Disputed Parcel of Real Property to Plaintiffs. (R., Vol. VII, Bates 1200-1203) This Partial 
Judgment quiets title in conformance with the Court's July 13, 2012, Memorandum Decision re: 
Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment (R., Vol. VI, Bates 1075-1084). 
On November 29, 2012, the Court issued its Supplemental Decision re: Remaining 
Liability Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint and Order re: Plaintiff's 
Motion for Reconsideration, as well as a new Partial Judgment Quieting Title in Disputed Parcel 
of Real Property to Plaintiffs. (R., Vol. VII, Bates 1200-1203) Through this ruling, the Court 
granted to the Plaintiffs an easement by implication and prescription over that portion of the 
Disputed Property that was quieted to Baker. (R., Vol. VII, Bates 1182-1199). The Court also 
confirmed that Coleman had failed to prove her claim of boundary by agreement/acquiescence. 
(Id.). 
Appellant Baker filed a Notice of Appeal on October 26, 2012 (R., Vol. VII, Bates 1163-
1181 ), and an Amended Notice of Appeal on January 9, 2013 (R, Vol. VII, Bates 1204-1223) .. 
The Respondents filed their Notice of Cross Appeal on January 9, 2013, and Amended Notice of 
Cross Appeal on January 15, 2013. (R., Vol. VII, Bates 1226-1233). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Appellant/Defendants Baker own property located at 4430 Upper Pack River 
Road, Sandpoint, Idaho (hereinafter referred to as "Baker Property"). (Tr., Court Trial p. 1021, 
L.16-19). 
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2. Baker's property shares a common boundary to the north with property currently 
owned by Respondent/Plaintiff Jean Coleman, Brian F. Davis and Terri Boyd-Davis (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Coleman Property"). (Tr., Court Trial, p. 1021, L. 20-23). 
3. In the early l 960's, both the Baker Property and the Coleman Property were 
owned by Harry and Edith Clark, who are the parents of Plaintiff/Respondent Jean Coleman. 
4. The Clarks gifted to Coleman the property she now owns through two warranty 
deeds, the first of which was executed on October 17, 1966, for the Northern portion of the 
Coleman property (hereinafter referred to as "the 1966 Coleman Deed"). (Ex. 2; Tr., Court Trial, 
p.1022, L.7- 116). 
5. Four years later, the Clarks gifted to Coleman by Warranty Deed executed on 
December 23rd, 1970, her southern parcel (hereinafter "the 1970 Coleman Deed"). (Ex. 3; Tr., 
Court Trial, p. 1022, L. 7- L.16). 
6. It is this Southern parcel that adjoins the Baker Property. 
7. At the time of these conveyances, Harry and Edith Clark owned the property both 
to the South and to the West of the parcels gifted to Coleman. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 158, L. 15-20, 
p. 1022, L. 21 ). 
8. Sometime in 1971, a blacksmith's cabin was moved onto the Coleman property by 
Harry Clark. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 165, L. 2-15, p. 1024, L. 15). 
9. On September 3, 1971, the Clarks sold that portion of the Baker Property that is 
identified on the surveys as "Parcel 1" to Cliff and Joan Johnson, Appellant Baker's 
predecessors-in-interest. (Ex. 7). 
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10. The Johnsons ultimately purchased three contiguous parcels of property from the 
Clarks, as well as another parcel from an unrelated third party, but only the Johnsons' 
Northernmost parcel borders property owned by Jean Coleman. (Ex. 6, 7, 8, 9; Tr., Court Trial 
p.1023). 
11. The Court found that all of these deeds at issue in this case were drafted personally 
by Harry Clark, who was not a trained surveyor. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 1035). 
12. After acquiring Parcel 1 from the Clarks, Cliff Johnson constructed a wooden 
fence on his property to contain his horses. (R., Vol. VII, Bates 1196; Tr., Court Trial, p. 1029). 
13. The fence, therefore, did not exist at the time that the Clarks conveyed the 
property to Coleman. 
14. The fence does not run along either the boundary line of the property to the North, 
or the boundary line between the property to the West, but meanders according to the topography 
of the land. It does not follow any of the boundary lines of any of the properties in the area. 
Parcell 
(Ex. C). 
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15. Following Harry Clark's death in 1975, the Bank of Idaho was named as Trustee 
for the Clark Estate. 
16. In 1976, Plaintiff Jean Coleman made a request to the Trustee for the conveyance 
of additional property in lieu of a debt that she claimed was owed from the Trust to Coleman for 
the payment of funeral expenses. 
17. The Trustee retained the services of Tucker Engineering Consultants to perform a 
survey of the land owned by the Clark Estate, and the land which had been transferred from the 
Clark Estate. 
18. Tucker Engineering recorded the "Survey for the Harry Clark Estates," dated July 
3, 1979, under instrument number 223083 (hereinafter referred to as "the Clark Survey"). (Ex. I 7, 
KKK). 
19. In doing so, the Tucker surveyors had difficulty surveying the Coleman deeds, 
because they contain two conflicting calls. (Ex. 17). 
20. On the one hand, the 1966 Coleman Deed for Coleman's Northern parcel starts by 
defining the point of true beginning by describing the following distance and bearing calls, but 
also indicates that the Eastern boundary of the parcel is to proceed "200 feet Southeasterly along 
the West boundary of Highway 130." (Ex. 3). 
21. However, when the distance calls are strictly followed, the Northwest corner of the 
Northern Coleman property falls to the North of what was Highway 130 at the time, so that the 
property line cannot proceed "200 feet Southeasterly along the West boundary of Highway 130." 




Bearing Call to 





(Ex. C, 16; Tr., Court Trial, p.49-50). 
West Boundary of 
What was Highway 
130 in 1970 
22. The 1970 Coleman Deed simply builds off of the legal description in the 1966 
Coleman Deed, and therefore contains the same conflict in calls. (Ex. 2, 3). 
23. As there is a conflict among the calls in the Coleman deeds, by operation of law 
the call to the road trumps the distance and bearing calls. Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. 
Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 119, 794 P.2d 1389, 1392 (1990) ("Monuments, natural 
or artificial, or lines marked on ground, control over calls for courses and distances.") 
24. The Tucker surveyors made various attempts to deal with this ambiguity in the 
Coleman Deeds, and their opinions are reflected in three surveys, which were admitted at trial, 
including the following: 
• Plat of Survey, undated (Ex. 23) 
• Survey for Harry Clark Estate, dated July 3, 1979 (Ex. 13 ). 
• Survey for Jean Coleman, dated June 26, 1981 (Ex. 14). 
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25. All of these Tucker surveys portray a Southern boundary bearing due West, which 
matches the bearing calls for the Southern boundaries in both Coleman deeds. (Ex. 13, 14, 23). 
26. The above referenced 1981 Tucker Survey was commissioned by Jean Coleman as 
is evidenced by the Survey itself, which indicates it was "for Jean L. Coleman & Clark Estate," 
and by the testimony of attorney Michael Stewart, who confirmed that he was in communication 
about the survey with Jean Coleman at the time it was being conducted. (Ex. 14; Tr., Court Trial, 
pp. 702-708). 
27. Tucker Engineering also provided legal descriptions for the Coleman Property, the 
Disputed Property, and the property directly to the West of the Coleman Property. (Ex. 21). 
28. Consequently, Coleman received actual and constructive notice at the time that 
these Tucker surveys were completed and recorded that she did not own up the fence line; yet, 
Coleman failed to take any action for 27 years to address what she now asserts are erroneous 
surveys. 
29. The Bakers acquired the Johnsons' property by Warranty Deed executed and 
recorded on June, 1, 2007, records of Bonner County, Idaho as instrument number 729995. (Ex. 
10). 
30. Soon after the Bakers acquired their property, their neighbor to the South indicated 
that he was the owner of a portion of the land that the Bakers had understood to be theirs. 
31. This caused the Bakers to contract with Glahe & Associates to survey the Bakers' 
property. 
32. A survey was subsequently performed by surveyor David Evans of Glahe & 
Associates, and the "Record of Survey for Tim Baker" dated November, 2007, was recorded in 
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Bonner County under instrument number 741564 (hereinafter referred to as "the Baker Survey"). 
(Ex. 15; Ex. C). 
33. On June 11, 2009, Respondent/Plaintiff Jean Coleman transferred an undivided 
interest in the Coleman Property to Respondent/Cross Appellant/Plaintiff Terri-Lynn Boyd Davis 
and Respondent/Plaintiff Brian Davis by Quitclaim Deed executed and recorded on June 16, 
2009, in the records of Bonner County under instrument number 774089. (Ex. 5). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED. 
1. Is the Court's finding that the Clarks intended to convey to Coleman property up 
to the fence line clearly erroneous, where the Court also concluded that the fence line did not 
exist at the time of the conveyance? 
2. Did the Court err in determining the intent of the Grantor by relying upon 
evidence of improvements made after conveyance and the use of the property by those that were 
not the Grantors? 
3. Did the Court err in refusing to find that Coleman was barred under the doctrine 
of laches from asserting her claims, after having been on notice for almost thirty years prior to 
bringing her claims? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
On appeal, the appellate Court will set aside findings of fact only upon a finding that they 
are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P 52( a). Appellate review of the decision of the trial court is limited 
to ascertaining whether substantial, competent evidence supports the findings of fact and whether 
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the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Crea v. Crea, 135 Idaho 246, 16 P.3d 922 
(2000); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). 
In construing a deed of conveyance, the trial court's primary function is to seek and give 
effect to the real intention of the parties. Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 770, 450 P.2d 990, 
993 (1969); Hogan v. Blakney, 73 Idaho 274,279,251 P.2d 209,213 (1952); Phillips Industries, 
Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 696-97, 827 P.2d 706, 709-10 (Ct.App.1992). Thus, if the 
language of the deed is unambiguous, the parties' intent will be ascertained from the deed itself 
as a matter of law, without resort to extrinsic evidence. Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 857, 
673 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1983); Gardner, 92 Idaho at 770-71, 450 P.2d at 993-94. If, however, the 
deed language is found to be ambiguous, the interpretation of the grantor's intent becomes a 
question of fact to be determined from the instrument itself and from all the surrounding facts 
and circumstances. Latham, 105 Idaho at 857, 673 P.2d at 1051; Gardner, 92 Idaho at 771,450 
P.2d at 994. 
In this case, there is no dispute that the Coleman deed is ambiguous. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 
1035). Thus, the District Court was tasked with determining the intent of the Grantors, Harry 
and Edith Clark, at the time they conveyed the property to Jean Coleman, on December 23, 1970. 
As discussed below, the Court's trial decision is clearly erroneous, because it is based upon a 
finding that the Clark's intended to convey up to a fence that did not exist at the time of the 
conveyance. 
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B. The Court's Finding that the Clarks intended to Convey to Coleman all of the 
Property up to the Fence Line is Clearly Erroneous where the Fence Did Not 
Exist at the Time of the Conveyance. 
Although Coleman asserted claims of adverse possess10n and boundary by 
agreement/acquiescence in her claim that she owns the real property extending to the fence line, 
the Court rejected both claims, finding that she had failed to prove the elements of either claim 
by clear and convincing evidence. Rather, the Court's decision was based solely upon a finding 
that Harry and Edith Clark, the original grantors of both Plaintiffs and Defendant's properties, 
intended in 1970 to convey to Jean Coleman land up to the fence line depicted on the 2007 Glahe 
Survey. (Ex. C). Yet, the Court also found that Cliff Johnson built the fence in 1971. (Tr., Court 
Trial, pp. 1040-1041 ). 
Respectfully, Baker submits that the Clarks could not have intended to convey property 
up to a fence line that did not exist at the time of the conveyance. Unless Harry Clark had reason 
to know in 1970 that a fence line was going to be constructed, and also know the exact location 
of where the fence would later be constructed, he could not have intended that the fence line 
demarcate the Southern boundary of the Coleman property. 
Moreover, the Court found that the fence line was subsequently built by Cliff Johnson, 
not Harry Clark, and there was not a shred of evidence presented at trial indicating that Johnson 
and Clark discussed the fence or its location. On the contrary, Cliff and Joan Johnson both 
testified that the fence was built by Cliff Johnson after the Johnson acquired the property to 
contain their horses, and no evidence as admitted at trial to indicate that Harry Clark was either 
involved in the construction of the fence, or knew that it was being built. (Tr., p. 377, L. 6; Tr. P. 
412, L. 1-2). Moreover, as the District Court recognized, Cliff Johnson testified at trial that the 
fence was erected solely to contain his horses and the shape of the fence was never intended to 
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mark a boundary and was located based upon the topography of the land. (R., Vol. VII, Bates 
1195-1196). Unless the Clarks had the ability to see into the future, they could not have intended 
to convey up to the fence line because they could not have known where it would be built. 
Thus, the finding that the Clarks intended, by the deed executed in 1970, to convey property up 
to the fence line is irreconcilable with the finding that Cliff Johnson built the fence after he 
acquired the property in 1971. The Court's decision to quiet title up to the fence was, therefore, 
clearly erroneous, and does not support its conclusion of law - that being that it was the Clarks' 
intent to grant to Coleman property which was defined on its Southern boundary by the fence. 
C. In Deciding that the Clarks Intended to Convey up to the Fence Line, The 
District Court Erroneously Relied Upon Features which did not Exist at the 
Time that the Clarks Conveyed the Property. 
In ruling that the Clarks intended to convey to Coleman property up to the fence line, the 
Court also based its finding that the Clarks' intended to convey the land up to the fence upon 
certain features, other than the fence, which also did not exist at the time that the Clarks executed 
the 1970 Coleman Deed. These include the existence of the cabin, the driveway leading to the 
cabin, a clothes line, and the parking lot in front of the cabin. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 1039). Jean 
Coleman testified there were no buildings on the property when she first acquired it from her 
parents, and that the cabin was moved within a year after the conveyance from the Clarks to her. 
(Tr., Court Trial, p. 165, L 2 - 7). From the pictures admitted at trial, it is clear that neither the 
parking lot nor the driveway to the cabin, which now abuts the cabin itself, existed at the time of 
the conveyance, and no evidence was admitted at trial that the Clarks were involved in any 
manner with their construction. 
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No driveway or parking 
area yet constructed 
between fence and cabin 
Because these features did not exist at the time the Clarks drafted the deed to Coleman, 
they cannot support a finding that the Clark' s intended to include these improvements in the 
conveyance, unless there was some evidence that, at the time that the Clarks drafted the deed, 
they knew these improvements would be made, and knew exactly where they would be located. 
No such evidence was admitted at trial, because no such evidence exists. The Clarks could not 
predict the future, and could not have intended to convey up to the non-existent fence line. 
In fact, the shape of the fence itself contradicts any finding that it was intended to mark a 
boundary line. All of the deeds drafted by Harry Clark that were admitted at trial contain 
southern boundaries which run directly East/West. This includes six different deeds. (Ex. 2, 3, 6, 
7, 8, 11 ). Yet, the fence does not run East/West, and in fact turns twice, is lies in a fish hook 
pattern, which does not even remotely follow any of the boundaries described in the deeds for 
any of the properties in this area. 





Thus, the location and bearing of the fence itself, as well as the direct testimony of Cliff 
Johnson (Tr., Court Trial, p. 414, L. 11-14), demonstrates that it was not intended to mark a 
boundary line. 
The Court also erroneously relied upon the use of the Disputed Property by Jean Coleman 
and her invitees in the years subsequent to the conveyance as evidence of the Clarks' intent. (Tr., 
Court Trial, pp.1038-1039). Specifically, the Court found that the parties "treated the fence line 
as the boundary line." (Tr., Court Trial, p.1038). It is clear, however, that the District Court 
conflated the concepts of boundary by acquiescence with what is required to be proven for a 
finding of the grantor's intent. Jean Coleman's subsequent use of her property, and construction 
of minor improvements thereon, may be probative of whether there was an agreement between 
she and the Johnson's to treat the fence as a boundary line. However, this evidence is in no way 
probative of what Harry and Edith Clark intended to convey on December 23, 1970. 
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In fact, despite the District Court's finding that the parties treated the fence as the 
boundary line, the Court found that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove the elements of boundary by 
acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence, because "acquiescence for a long period of time 
does not necessarily tip the scales in favor of the encroaching party," particularly where there is 
evidence on the record as to the manner and circumstances as to the creation of the fence. (R., 
Vol. VII, Bates l 191-1196)(quoting Huskinson v. Nelson, 152 Idaho 547,553,272 P.3d 519, 525 
(2012). The use of the Disputed Property by Jean Coleman over the subsequent years since the 
conveyance may be relevant to the boundary by acquiescence claim, but it is not relevant to the 
determination of what the Clark's intended to convey when they drafted the 1970 Coleman 
Deed. The focus must be on what the Clarks could have known at the time, not what Jean 
Coleman has done in the forty years since she acquired the property. 
While there was no evidence at trial indicating that the Clarks were involved with the 
creation of the driveway to the cabin, or the parking lot, Jean Coleman did testify that Harry 
Clark and a friend moved the cabin onto the Disputed Property. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 165, L. 2-15, 
p. 1024, L. 15). 
The District Court gave considerable weight to its finding that Harry Clark assisted in 
the placement of the cabin on the Coleman property, and concluded that Harry Clark would not 
have intentionally placed the cabin on the property line. Even if this is true, it lends no weight to 
the finding that the Clarks intended to convey up to the fence line. There was no evidence 
admitted at trial that the cabin's placement on the land had anything to do with the then 
nonexistent fence line. At most, therefore, the cabin tends to prove that the Clarks intended to 
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convey at least some of the property that they later conveyed to the Johnsons, but not that they 
intended to convey up to a fence which was not in existence at the time of the conveyance. 
These findings, therefore, do not support the Court's legal conclusion that Coleman is 
entitled to quiet title in all of the property to the North of the fence. 
D. The Court's Reliance on Surveyor Robert Stratton's Opinion is Clearly 
Erroneous Where Stratton Admitted that he "Arbitrarily" Held the Southern 
Boundary of the Location of the Fence, and Rotated the Entire Legal 
Description by 23 Degrees. 
In its findings of fact and law, the District Court also relied upon the testimony of 
Coleman's expert witness surveyor, Robert Stratton. Mr. Stratton testified at trial that he had 
created a number of different examples of how the legal descriptions in the Coleman and 
Johnson Deeds can be interpreted, and those opinions are set forth in various diagrams that were 
admitted at trial, and labeled by Mr. Stratton as Figures 1 through 8. (Ex.16). The Court found 
that "figure 6 seems most consistent with the intent of the Clarks." (Tr., Court Trial, p. 1043. 
This conclusion is clearly erroneous. 
Mr. Stratton admitted at trial that he did not perform a formal survey of the boundaries of 
either the Coleman or Baker properties. Rather, he went to the property a single time on 
November 30, 2010 with his father, and spent four hours performing what he described as a 
"field survey," by which he documented the features that existed on the property in the winter of 
2010, at a time when there was 12 inches of snow on the ground. (Ex. 16; Tr., Court Trial, pp.79 
- 80, 85). Mr. Stratton then created various diagrams to match the existing features. (Ex.16). 
These features, according to Mr. Stratton's testimony, included the Pack River Road (a/k/a 
Highway No. 130), the fence, the cabin, the driveway and the parking lot. (Id.). Yet, with the 
exception of Pack River Road, none of those features existed at the time that the Clarks conveyed 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL BRIEF - 24 
the property to Jean Coleman. Thus, they could not have played any role in Harry Clark's 
determination as to where to locate the property line. Moreover, Pack River Road washed out on 
numerous occasions (Tr., Court Trial, pp. 112, 151, 258, 259, 312, 313, 741, 742, 800-801), and 
has been widened, paved and realigned (Tr., Court Trial, pp.800-801, 871, L. 11-15) in the years 
between 1970 when the Coleman deed was drafted, and 2010, when Stratton did his field survey. 
Consequently, the road could not have been in the identical location in 2010, as it was in 1970. 
In fact, Mr. Stratton admitted that the location of the road in 2010 was "definitely" different than 
where it was located at the time the Clarks conveyed the property to Coleman. (Tr., Court Trial, 
p. 97). Nevertheless, Stratton's Figure 6 is based upon his decision to "arbitrarily" locate the 
edge of the Pack River Road 30 feet from its current center line. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 55, L. 2-
21 ). Stratton' s reliance upon features that exist in 2010, but did not exist in 1970, is, therefore, 
clearly erroneous if the goal is to derive what was the intent of the grantor in 1970. That intent 
must be derived solely from what the grantor knew at the time, or the grantor's subsequent 
actions, not the actions of others, or improvements that were later constructed. 
In fact, the best evidence of the Grantor's intent, and the only direct evidence admitted at 
trial, are the Coleman Deeds themselves, which were drafted by Harry Clark personally. (Tr., 
Court Trial, p. 80, L. 15-21). They contain his statements as to what the Clarks intended to gift 
to Jean Coleman. Because these are the only statements made directly by the Clarks that are in 
the record, any analysis of the intent of the Clarks must start with these deeds. While extrinsic 
evidence can be considered to resolve an ambiguity in the deeds, such evidence cannot 
completely supplant the deeds themselves. City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 
4th 232, 238, 914 P.2d 160, 164 (1996) ("Extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret the 
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instrument, but not to give it a meaning to which it is not susceptible, and it is the 
instrument itself that must be given effect."). Yet, Stratton' s opinion, as set forth in Figure 6 
(Ex. 16), ignores numerous calls in these deeds, most strikingly the calls that define Coleman' s 
Southern boundary. 
The 1970 Coleman Deed defines the Southern boundary line of the Coleman Property as 
"225 feet West" from the "Boundary of Highway 130," which is known currently as Pack River 
Road. (Ex. F). Nothing in this deed calls to a fence line. This is logical, as the fence did not 
exist at the time that the deed was drafted. The call of "225 feet West" is maintained in all of the 
surveys performed by the Tucker Engineering surveyors which were performed in the late 
1970' s and early 1980' s, as well as the survey performed by David Evans of Glahe & Associates, 
in 2007. (Ex. 13, 14, 15, & 23): 
Tucker 1981 Survey 
Tucker 1979 Survey 
Tucker Unrecorded Survev- P's Ex. Z3 · Glahe 2007 Survey 
(Ex. 13, 14, 15). 
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Even Coleman's expert, Mr. Stratton, maintained this bearing call for the Southern 
Boundary in all but one of his interpretations of the deeds: 
Stratton Figure 6 
Stratton Figure 4 Stratton Figure 5 
Stratton Figure 8 
Stratton Figure 7 
(Ex.16). 
In Figure 6, however, Mr. Stratton did not depict the Southern Boundary as extending 
225 feet West, as is stated in the Deed, but instead depicts the Southern boundary as bearing 
Southwest. (Ex.16). When asked at trial to explain this departure from the bearing call in the 
1970 Coleman Deed, Mr. Stratton admitted that in order to reach Figure 6, he had to, in his 
words, "arbitrarily" rotate the entire legal description 23 degrees counterclockwise, so that the 
Southern Boundary would fall "roughly" along the fence line. (Tr., Trial Court, pp. 107-108). 
Nothing in the deed itself calls for such a rotation. Rather, the fence line itself is the only 
justification for such a drastic departure from the language of the deed itself. However, because 
we know that the fence did not exist at the time Harry Clark drafted the Coleman deed, Harry 
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Clark simply could not have intended that the entire legal description be rotated to match a non-
existent fence. Stratton's conclusion assumes that Harry Clark could have known where the 
fence would be located, and is, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
Moreover, when converted to an actual survey, rather than a theoretical diagram, 
Stratton's Figure 6 results in a legal description which abandons nearly every distance and 
bearing call in the deeds that were actually drafted by Harry Clark. 
(R., Vol. VI, Bates 1115-1121, 1129-1132; R. Vol. VII., Bates 1200-1203). 
The relevant language in the 1970 Coleman Deed reads: 
(Ex. F). 
[From] the true point of beginning; thence 450 feet Southeasterly 
along the West Boundary of Highway No. 130; thence 225 feet 
West; thence Northwesterly to a point 130 feet West of said 
Highway; thence 130 feet East to the true point of beginning. 
A direct comparison of the deed itself with the Stratton survey and the legal description 
contained in the Partial Judgment reveals that Stratton's interpretation of Harry Clark's intent 
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ignores virtually every call in the deeds drafted by Harry Clark, in favor of arbitrarily rotating the 
legal description to fit the Plaintiff's desired outcome - ownership of the property up to the fence 
line: 
Lamma!!e in 1970 Ouitclaim Deed Disouted Parcel oer Partial Jud!!ment 
Thence 450 feet Southeasterly along Thence 4 71.4 7 feet Southeasterly along the West 
West boundary of Highway No. 130, boundary of the new Pack River Road, 
Thence 225 feet West Thence 225 feet traveling Southwesterly at 
N66°52'49"E 
Thence and undisclosed distance Northwesterly 
traveling at N37°01 '01 "W 
Thence East approximately 95 feet 
Thence Northwesterly to a point 130 feet West Thence approximately 350 feet Northwesterly 
of said Highway traveling at N42°54'03"W 
Thence 130 feet East to the true point of Thence East along a curve a distance of 
beginning approximately 82.95 feet 
(Ex. F; R., Vol. VI, Bates 1115-1121, 1129-1132; R. Vol. VII., Bates 1200-1203). 
While the Coleman Deeds are admittedly ambiguous because the distance and bearing call 
to the point of true beginning conflicts with the call to the boundary of the highway, this does not 
justify the complete abandonment of nearly every call in the deed. Any interpretation of the 
deeds must give effect to as many of the calls in the deeds as is reasonably possible. Sun Valley 
Shamrock Res., Inc., 118 Idaho at 120, 794 P.2d at 1393 ("When construing a deed description, 
effect must be given, if possible, to all of the language contained in the description."). It is 
simply not reasonable to find that the deed contains an implied call to a fence line, when no such 
call is indicated, and the fence did not exist at the time of the conveyance. The District Court's 
findings in this regard are therefore, clearly erroneous. 
In fact, if Mr. Stratton is to be believed, then Harry Clark was unable to tell the difference 
between West and Southwest, to the effect that when he included "West" in the 1970 Coleman 
Deed, he meant 23 degrees to the Southwest. However, the 1970 Coleman Deed is not the only 
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deed that was drafted by Harry Clark. Five other Deeds were also drafted by Clark. Four of 
these deeds define their respective Southern boundaries by a call to due West (Ex. 2, 6, 7, 8). 
The logical extent of Mr. Stratton's theory would require that all of parcels for which Harry 
Clark drafted the deeds would need to be rotated 23 degrees counterclockwise, down to the 
section line. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 123). 
Deeds Drafted by Harry Clark which 
contain call to "West" as Southern 
Boundary 
Yet, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that Harry Clark was unable to 
read a compass to determine that West was not Southwest, and the resulting confusion that 
would result from rotating all of these parcels by 23 degrees is further evidence of the erroneous 
nature of Mr. Stratton's opinion. 
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E. The Partial Judgment Results in Such an Oddly Shaped Parcel as to Demonstrate 
that the District Court's Decision is Clearly Erroneous. 
At trial, the District Court considered evidence from three surveyors: (1) Tucker 
Engineering, from which three historical surveys were admitted into evidence; (2) Robert 
Stratton, the Plaintiffs expert witness; and (3) David Evans, the Defendant's expert witness. 
Although the interpretations by the three surveyors conflict as to certain distance and bearing 
calls, they were generally consistent with regard to the shape of the 1970 Coleman parcel - in 
that the Coleman parcel is a quadrilateral, or a quadrilateral with a slight curve. 
Tucker 1981 Survey 
Tucker 1979 Survey 
Tucker Unrecorded Survey- P's Ex. 23 · Glahe Z007 Survey 
These interpretations as to the shape of the Coleman parcel comport with the legal 
description of the 1970 Coleman Deed, as drafted by Harry Clark, which states, in relevant part: 
[From] the true point of beginning; thence 450 feet Southeasterly 
along the West Boundary of Highway No. 130; thence 225 feet 
West; thence Northwesterly to a point 130 feet West of said 
Highway; thence 130 feet East to the true point of beginning. 
(Ex. F). 
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From this description, it is clear that Harry Clark intended the parcel be a simple 
quadrilateral, with four comers, with the Eastern boundary running along the highway. This has 
been confirmed by the Plaintiffs' expert, Robert Stratton (Ex. 16), who provided at trial many 
interpretations of the Coleman deeds, all of which demonstrate clearly that the legal description 
drafted by Harry Clark in the 1970 deed conveys a four cornered quadrangle: 
Stratton Figure 6 
Stratton Figure 4 Stratton Figure 5 
Stratton Figure 8 
Stratton Figure 7 
Even in Stratton's Figure 6, in which Stratton rotates the legal description by more than 23 
degrees in order to fit the fence line (Ex. 16), Stratton' s interpretation of the shape of the 
Coleman parcels is a simple four cornered quadrilateral. The difference in this interpretation is 
that it is rotated counter-clockwise to match a fence line that did exist at the time the deed was 
drafted. It does not, however, drastically change the shape of the property so described. 
The shape of the parcel that the District Court detennined was gifted by the Clarks to Jean 
Coleman, however, is not a quadrilateral, but is the following bizarre shape: 
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The District Court's decision is based upon a finding that Harry Clark intended to convey 
this parcel of property to Jean Coleman. Yet, absolutely nothing in the language of the Coleman 
Deeds gives any indication that such an oddly shaped property was being conveyed, and no 
evidence at trial was admitted which supports a finding that Harry Clark intended to convey a 
property of this shape. 
While it was undisputed that the Coleman Deeds contain ambiguous legal descriptions, 
this finding does not allow the District Court to completely ignore the language of the 
deeds, and draw from whole cloth an entirely new and factually unsupported boundary 
line. The best evidence as to what Harry Clark intended to convey to Jean Coleman continues to 
be the legal descriptions that he drafted. Although there are discrepancies, this does not justify 
the District Court ignoring virtually all of the distance and bearing calls in the deeds, and 
creating a parcel which is completely contrary to the parcel described in the deed. Sun Valley 
Shamrock Res., Inc., 118 Idaho at 120, 794 P.2d at 1393 ("When construing a deed description, 
effect must be given, if possible, to all of the language contained in the description."). 
Stratton's opinion as reflected by his Figure 6 cannot reflect the intent of the Clark's. 
Rather, it reflects the desires of Coleman to own up to the fence line, and is based upon 
"features" that did not exist at the time that the Clark's conveyed their property to Coleman. The 
Court's reliance upon this particular opinion of Stratton, therefore, is clearly erroneous, and does 
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not support its conclusion of law - being that Coleman owns the Disputed Portion up to the fence 
line. 
F. The Court's "Alternative Decision" is Supported by Substantial Evidence. 
In response to Appellant Baker's motion for reconsiderations and objections to the 
proposed judgment, the District Court appears to have recognized the issues described above, 
and took the unorthodox approach of issuing an "Alternative Decision," that "would be effective 
only if the earlier decision was reversed on appeal." (R., Vol. VI, p. 1086). Unlike the District 
Court's earlier decision, this Alternative Decision is not based upon a finding that the Clarks 
intended to convey up to a fence that did not exist, and is supported by substantial evidence. 
In both its original decision and it its Alternative Decision, the District Court correctly 
found that the call to the point of true beginning in the Coleman deeds conflicts with the call to 
the Western Boundary of Highway 130. This does not, however, require a finding that the 
Clark's intended to convey to a fence line which did not exist. The proper resolution to this issue 
was set forth as far back as the late 1970's, by the original surveyor, Tucker Engineering, in its 
undated Plat of Survey which was admitted at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 23. (Ex. 23). 
Recognizing that the call to the highway trumps the distance and bearing calls to the 
point of true beginning, the Tucker surveyors were required to shift the legal description South 
so that the Eastern boundary of the Coleman property runs along the edge of Highway 130, a/k/a 
Pack River Road. Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc., 118 Idaho at 120, 794 P.2d at 1393 
("Monuments, natural or artificial, or lines marked on ground, control over calls for courses and 
distances."). Doing this allows the Coleman Deed to fit to the road, while maintaining all of the 
remaining calls in the 1970 Coleman Deed. The result is an overlap of the legal descriptions in 
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the 1970 Coleman Deed (Ex. 3 ), and the Warranty Deed by which the Clarks conveyed Parcel 1 





Because the Southern Coleman Deed was executed and recorded in 1970 (Ex. 3), whereas 
the Johnson Deed was executed in 1971(Ex. 7), the Coleman Deed is senior to the Johnson Deed. 
To the extent there is an overlap, therefore, the Coleman Deed prevails. Sun Valley Land & 
Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862, 867, 853 P.2d 607, 612 (Ct. App. 1993) (The instrument 
first recorded takes precedence.) Because the Clarks had already conveyed the property to 
Coleman in 1970, inclusive of the area which is indicated above as the "overlap," the subsequent 
conveyance of this same property to the Johnson's was ineffective. As the District Court put it, 
"you can't give away what you don't have." (Tr. Court Trial, p.1042). However, this is limited 
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to that portion of the Johnson Property which is also legally described in the 1970 Coleman Deed 
- i.e. the area of "overlap," as depicted on Plaintiffs Exhibit 23. (Ex. 23). 
The District Court reasoned that when Harry Clark assisted in placing a cabin on the 
property in 1971, he would not have placed the cabin on what he believed to be the boundary 
line. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 103 8). The point is well taken, but it does not necessarily follow that 
Harry Clark intended to convey all the way up to the fence line, which, as the District Court 
concluded, had not yet been built. Rather, the more logical explanation is that in drafting the 
Coleman and Johnson deeds, Harry Clark mistakenly included an overlap, which is depicted in 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23. (Ex. 23). 
The strongest evidence to support this interpretation of the deeds is the language of the 
deeds themselves, which is the only true evidence on the record coming directly from Harry 
Clark regarding his intent. The 1970 Quitclaim Deed drafted by Harry Clark describes the 
Southern Coleman parcel as follows: 
. . . [From J the true point of beginning; Thence 450 feet 
Southeasterly along the West boundary of Highway No. 130; 
thence 225 feet West; thence Northwesterly to a point 130 feet 
West of said Highway; thence 130 feet East to the true point of 
beginning. 
(Ex. F) ( emphasis added). 
Each of the calls in the 1970 Coleman Deed that are emphasized are maintained in the 
unrecorded Tucker survey (Ex. 23), and abandoned in the Court's Partial Judgment. (R., Vol. 
VII, Bates 1200-1203). 
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Tucker Survey- P's Exh. 23 Stratton Survey 
• Call Along Pack River Road: The distance of 450 feet along Pack River Road is 
accurately shown in the Tucker Survey Plaintiff's Exhibit 23; whereas, the 
Stratton survey depicts this distance to be about 4 71.4 7. (Ex. 16; 23; R. Vol. VI, 
p. 1200-1203) 
• Southern Boundarv: The call of the Southern boundary as 225 West is also 
maintained in the unrecorded Tucker survey, while the Stratton survey rotates this 
line by 23 degrees counterclockwise, resulting in a parcel of far greater size than 
is described in the deed. (Id.). 
• Eastern Boundary: The Clark deed then calls for the eastern line to extend 
"Northwesterly, to a point 130 feet West" of Pack River Road. Again, this 
matches what is depicted in the Tucker survey. Yet, in the Stratton Survey, the 
Eastern Boundary extends Northwesterly an undisclosed number of feet, to a 
point which is more than 268.48 feet from the Pack River road, then travels 
directly East approximately 92. 79 feet, then travels Northwest more 
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approximately 350 feet. The Clark Deed contains no indication whatsoever that 
Clark was intending to convey property of these dimensions or distances. (Id.). 
The Tucker Survey, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23 provides the only reasonable means to reconcile 
the calls in the deed with the placement of the cabin by Harry Clark and his friend, as the cabin 
sits well within the overlap depicted in Plaintiffs Exhibit 23. (Ex. 23). If Exhibit 23 was Harry 
Clark's intent, this would explain the placement of the cabin, and results in the entire cabin being 
located within the Coleman Property. 
Additionally, the Plaintiff's surveyor, Robert Stratton, submitted an interpretation of the 
deeds which matches the Tucker Survey admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit 23 - his Figure 8, which 
is depicted as follows: 
(Ex. 16). 
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NOTE: 
:HIS DRAl\1NG SHOWS THE 
CO~EMAN DEEDS SUFERIMPCS[D 
OVcR THE PHYSICAL FEATURES 
AND LETTI~G !He W.ST LINE Or 
PARCEi. CIA FLOAT. DIMENSIONS 
THA i I/ARY FROM DEED ARE 
SHOWN. 
While Stratton preferred his Figure 6, which by Stratton's own admission required that he 
arbitrarily hold the Southern boundary line along the not yet built fence line, he also indicated in 
his report that this Figure 8 was "a reasonable alternative based on the deeds." (Ex. 16). The 
Bakers respectfully submit that this is the only reasonable interpretation, as it holds nearly all of 
the calls in the deed, while reconciling Harry Clark's placement of the cabin. Sun Valley 
Shamrock Res., Inc., 118 Idaho at 120, 794 P.2d at 1393 ("When construing a deed description, 
effect must be given, if possible, to all of the language contained in the description."). 
Other than the placement of the Cabin, there is no other competent evidence that would 
support a finding that Clark intended to convey the property described in the Partial Judgment. 
The driveway to the cabin did not exist at the time of the conveyance, because the cabin had not 
yet been placed on the property. (Tr., Court Trial, pp.411, 412). The same is true for the parking 
area, and the fence had not yet been built by Clifford Johnson, who would not purchase his 
property until the year following the receipt of the property by Coleman. Consequently, the only 
reasonable interpretation of the evidence is depicted in the Plaintiffs Exhibit 23. (Ex. 23). 
G. The Court's Partial Judgment Results in a Reformation of the Deed Without the 
Requisite Finding of Proof by Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
Although the District Court framed its original decision on a finding of the intent of 
Harry and Edith Clark, the result was a complete reformation of the 1970 Coleman Deed to 
match the fence line that was constructed in 1971. Essentially, Coleman was asking the Court to 
find that the Clarks' intended to grant up to the fence line, but mistakenly left out the call to the 
fence in the Deed. By ruling that the Clarks intended to grant up to the fence line, the Court 
effectively reformed the 1970 Coleman Deed to include a call to the fence line. 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL BRlEF - 39 
Yet, the Court reached this decision by only a preponderance of the evidence. 
Reformation of a deed, however, requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. 
In interpreting a deed, the court's goal is to carry out the real 
intention of the parties. C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766, 
25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001). If an instrument does not reflect the true 
intent of the parties due to mutual mistake, then reformation of that 
instrument may be the proper remedy. Bilbao v. Krettinger, 91 
Idaho 69, 72-73, 415 P.2d 712, 715-16 (1966). "A mutual mistake 
occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a 
misconception regarding a basic assumption or vital fact upon 
which the bargain is based." Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 
934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997). The court acts properly in reforming the 
instrument to reflect the agreement the parties would have made 
but for the mistake. Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 640-41, 671 
P.2d 1099, 1103-04 (Ct.App.1983). What the parties actually 
intended is a question of fact. Id. at 641, 671 P.2d at 1104. The 
party alleging the mutual mistake has the burden of proving it 
by clear and convincing evidence. Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 
294,296,527 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1974). 
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,482, 129 P.3d 1223, 1231 (2006) (emphasis added). 
In its original decision, the Court made no findings that the Plaintiff had proven by clear 
and convincing evidence that the Clark's mistakenly left out the call to the fence line in the 1970 
Coleman Deed. The Court's ruling, therefore, is clearly erroneous, and must be overturned. 
The Court's Alterative Decision, however, does not require reformation of the deed. It 
only requires a finding that the 1970 Coleman Deed describes property which overlaps with the 
property conveyed to the Johnsons in 1971. It does not require the Court to reform the deed to 
include a call to a fence line which was not included in the language of the deed itself. Thus, the 
Court's Alterative Decision applies the correct standard of proof. 
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H. The District Court Erroneously Failed to Consider the Baker's Defense of Laches. 
Baker asserted an affirmative defense of !aches in their Amended Answer, and argued 
this defense at trial. The Court, however, did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of 
law with respect to this affirmative defense. The Bakers requested that the Court consider the 
defense in reconsidering its opinion. 
The evidence at trial demonstrated that Jean Coleman was aware of the issues with 
respect to the legal descriptions for her properties no later than 1981. Tucker Engineering 
provided such notification by letter dated October 12, 1979. (Ex. HH). A survey was completed 
for Jean Coleman, as evidenced by the 1981 Tucker Survey, which is labeled "for Jean 
Coleman." (Ex. B). Evidence was admitted at trial that Ms. Coleman was part of this process, 
and asked to be present during the Jean Coleman survey. (Ex. X; Tr. Court Trial, p. 701- 708). 
New legal descriptions were drafted in 1981 for Coleman by Tucker Engineering, which directly 
addressed the ambiguities in the deeds. (Ex. 21 ). 
Yet, Coleman chose not to address these issues until almost 30 years later, when 
witnesses are no longer available, evidence is lost, and memories have faded. The loss of such 
evidence particularly the Court's finding that Cliff Johnson's memory is not reliable (Tr., Court 
Trial, pp. I 029-1030)) has caused substantial prejudice to the Bakers. 
Circumstances such as these are exactly why the doctrine of !aches exists, and Baker 
requested that that the Court make particularized findings of fact and conclusions of law 
regarding this defense. (R., Vol. V, pp. 0856-0857). In ruling on Baker's Motion for 
Reconsideration, the District Court identified the elements of !aches as follows: 
To invoke the defense of !aches, Idaho requires the following 
elements to be proven: ( 1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights, 
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(2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, the plaintiff having had 
notice and an opportunity to institute a suit, (3) lack of knowledge 
by defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights, and ( 4) injury or 
prejudice to defendant in event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the 
suit is not held to be barred. Lapse of time, although an important 
element, is not alone controlling in determining the applicability of 
the defense of laches, unless the party claiming laches was injured 
or placed at a disadvantage by such delay. 
Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho 252,259, 706 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Huppert 
v. Wo(ford, 91 Idaho 249,257,420 P.2d 11, 19 (1966)). 
The District Court went on to rule: 
The Bakers invaded Jean Coleman's rights when they tore do'Wll a portion of the fence. There 
was no material delay by the plaintiffs in asserting their rights. Accordingly, the Bakers did not 
prove the defense of laches. 
(R., Vol. V., Bates 0886). 
This analysis is clearly erroneous. Jean Coleman invaded the rights of the Johnsons (the 
Bakers' predecessor's-in-interest) by knowingly utilizing a portion of the Johnsons' property 
which she did not own. The evidence at trial demonstrated that Ms. Coleman knew about the 
problematic legal descriptions by 1981. By waiting almost 30 years to assert a claim to the 
property, she allowed the evidence to grow stale. The Court erred by failing to consider this 
defense from the standpoint of the Bakers, rather than the standpoint of Coleman, and by failing 
to make particularized findings of fact as to whether Ms. Coleman was, in fact, aware of these 
issues, and whether her delay in bringing the claim materially prejudiced the Appellants. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Bakers respectfully submit that the decision of the District 
Court is clearly erroneous and not based upon substantial evidence. Consequently, the Bakers 
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request that the Supreme Court reverse that decision and either adopt the Court's Alternative 
Decision, or remand with instructions to the District Court to make a determination of the 
Grantor's intent based only upon evidence that the Clarks could have considered when drafting 
the deeds by which they conveyed the property to Coleman. 
") ,.,_,; 
DATED this 'X 0 day of November, 2013. 
BERG & McLAUGHLIN, CHTD. 
cu~ 
ANDRA NELSON 
Attorneys for Appellants Baker 
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On N ovember~O 13, I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served by the 
following methods on the parties listed below as follows, which is the last known address for the 
listed party: 
Terri Boyd-Davis D By Hand Delivery 
12738 N. Strahorn Rd. gBy U.S. Mail 
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Plaintiff D By Facsimile Transmission 
D Other 
Brian F. Davis @- By Hand Delivery 
12738 N. Strahorn Rd. By U.S. Mail 
Hayden, ID 83835 D By Overnight Mail 
Plaintiff D By Facsimile Transmission 
D Other 
Jean L. Coleman ~ By Hand Delivery 
2902 N. 5th Ave., By U.S. Mail 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 D By Overnight Mail 
Plaintiff D By Facsimile Transmission 
D Other 
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